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Notes on Joint Criminal Enterprise before the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
Fausto Pocar∗ 
For two decades, the need for prosecution of mass atrocities including war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and violations of basic human rights 
norms has been met by the creation and proliferation of international and hybrid 
criminal tribunals.1 Like the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals,2 these international 
judiciaries were designed to impose individual criminal responsibility for mass 
atrocities and violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. 
These brief notes will discuss one aspect of this individual criminal responsibility 
through the case law of the ICTY, as a means of paying tribute to Professor 
Linda Carter, for her invaluable and constant contributions and distinguished 
scholarship addressing issues connected with international criminal justice, 
which I myself have benefited from—through our numerous, common 
endeavours—and for which I wish to express my sincerest gratitude. 
One of the main features of the perpetration of massive international crimes 
lies in the consideration that such atrocities are most frequently achieved through 
the cooperation of many persons in furtherance of a common criminal purpose, 
while at the same time, are often not directly attributable to a single individual’s 
criminal conduct. Such collective criminality often creates an evidentiary hurdle 
whereby the highest-ranking officials, the most culpable offenders, or most 
influential members of the group sharing a common purpose are those against 
whom there is the least amount of evidence of direct criminal conduct, resulting 
in functional impunity. 
 
* Professor Emeritus, University of Milan; Judge and former President, International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”). I would also like to thank my Associate Legal Officer, Ms. Nicole Rangel, 
for her thoughtful review of this article. Ms. Rangel is an alumna of the University of Pacific McGeorge School 
of Law (class of 2010) and in that capacity, expresses her sincere appreciation to Professor Linda Carter for her 
mentorship, guidance, and inspiration. 
1. The ICTY and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) were created by the Security 
Council under its Chapter VII authority and thus may be categorized as international tribunals. See S.C. Res. 
827, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827, at 2 (May 25, 1993) (establishing the ICTY), and S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/955, at 202 (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing the ICTR). Hybrid tribunals are those adjudicated by a 
combination of internationally and nationally appointed judges and may exist within the respective national 
judiciary such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia. While the ad hoc tribunals were the first international tribunals, the International Criminal Court 
(“ICC”) is the only international criminal tribunal thus far set up under a multilateral treaty. See Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. See also Fausto Pocar, The International 
Proliferation of Criminal Jurisdictions Revisited: Uniting or Fragmenting International Law, in COEXISTENCE, 
COOPERATION, AND SOLIDARITY 1705, 1723 (2010). 
2. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND THE TOKYO WAR 
CRIMES TRIALS (1945–1948), https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nuremberg (last visited Aug. 22, 
2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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The international and hybrid criminal tribunals were designed to combat this 
impunity and to prosecute those most responsible for crimes against international 
law. In executing this mandate, the ICTY reviewed the relevant customary 
international law and concluded that customary international law includes 
liability for the commission of crimes through “collective criminality” under 
Joint Criminal Enterprise (“JCE”).3 
Although the applicability of JCE as a specific mode of liability has been 
debated, the idea of imposing individual criminal responsibility for crimes 
committed by a group in furtherance of a common plan is widely accepted in 
national jurisdictions throughout the globe.4 
The concept of JCE was first articulated and applied in the Tadić Appeal 
Judgement.5 The prosecution appealed, inter alia, that the Trial Chamber 
improperly applied the “common purpose doctrine” in concluding that it was not 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Duško Tadić (“Tadić”) played any part in 
the five Jaskići village murders.6 Acknowledging that the group to which Tadić 
belonged had committed these murders, the Appeals Chamber then determined 
“whether the acts of one person can give rise to the criminal culpability of 
another where both participate in the execution of a common criminal plan,” and 
if so, what mens rea is required.7 
The Appeals Chamber began this inquiry determining that under the 
principle of personal culpability, a person may only be held responsible for 
crimes in which that person engaged or participated in some way,8 and that this 
principle is enshrined in Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute which lays out the 
modes of liability for establishing the personal responsibility of an accused.9 
Therefore, the Appeals Chamber was left to determine whether commission of a 
crime through participation in a common criminal purpose was within the ambit 
of Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute.10 
Applying the rules of statutory interpretation, the Appeals Chamber 
concluded that liability for common or collective criminality was included in 
 
3. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶ 191, 194–95, 229 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Jul. 15, 1999) [hereinafter Tadić Appeal Judgement]; Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-
97-25-A, Judgement, ¶ 29 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 17, 2003). See also Fausto Pocar 
& Nicole Rangel, Individual Criminal Responsibility for Collective Criminality: A Comparative Analysis of the 
Development of Joint Criminal Enterprise at the International Criminal Tribunals, in THE GLOBAL 
COMMUNITY YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & JURISPRUDENCE 275 (2011). 
4. See e.g., Tadić Appeal Judgement, supra note 3, at ¶¶ 195–226, 233. 
5. Id. at ¶ 201. 
6. Id. at ¶¶ 172–73. 
7. Id. at ¶¶ 185,180. 
8. Id. at ¶ 186. 
9. Id. at ¶¶ 186, 189–90. The Statute of the ICTY also provides for personal criminal liability through 
command responsibility under Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute. 
10. Id. 
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Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute as a means of commission of a crime.11 It held 
that Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute undoubtedly included liability for physical 
perpetration of crimes but that “the commission of one of the crimes [ . . . ] of the 
Statute might also occur through participation in the realisation of a common 
design or purpose.”12 
Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber correctly concluded that the object and 
purpose test, applied to the ICTY Statute, provides for collective criminality 
because it seeks to convict “all those ‘responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law’ committed in the former Yugoslavia.”13 The 
Secretary General echoed this sentiment in his report, stating that, “all persons 
who participate in the planning, preparation or execution of serious violations of 
international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia are individually 
responsible for such violations.”14 
Similarly, the Appeals Chamber recognized that the very nature of the crimes 
prosecuted at the ICTY frequently involve common criminality. In other words, 
although only one person may have physically perpetrated the crime, “the 
participation and contribution of the other members of the group is often vital in 
facilitating the commission of the offence in question,” and thus those members 
of the group are often those “most responsible”15 for the commission of such 
crimes and should be held criminally responsible. 
The Appeals Chamber affirmatively determined that criminal responsibility 
exists for “actions perpetrated by a collectivity of persons in furtherance of a 
common criminal design.”16 However, it acknowledged that the ICTY Statute 
does not explicitly, or implicitly, provide the substantive elements of this mode 
of liability.17 Thus, the Appeals Chamber engaged in a comprehensive review of 
the applicable rules of customary international law in order to determine the 
substantive elements for proving liability through collective criminality.18 
The Appeals Chamber reviewed the Nuremberg Charter, Control Council 
Law No. 10, various post WWII cases,19 treaties,20 and national case law,21 and 
 
11. Id. at ¶ 188–93. 
12. Id. at ¶ 188. 
13. Id. at ¶ 189 (emphasis in original). 
14. U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 2 OF 
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 808 ¶ 53, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) (emphasis added); see also Tadić 
Appeal Judgement, supra note 3, at ¶ 190. 
15. Tadić Appeal Judgement, supra note 3, at ¶ 191 (emphasis added). The ICTY’s mandate provides for 
the prosecution of those “most responsible” for the atrocities committed in the region of the former Yugoslavia. 
Effectively executing this mandate requires that “commit” under Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute implicitly 
includes commission by common criminality (i.e. JCE liability) because many of these accused authored or 
participated in these common criminal purposes in their capacity as high ranking officials or politicians. 
16. Id. at ¶ 193. 
17. Id. at ¶ 194. 
18. Id. at ¶¶ 194–228. 
19. With respect to: basic JCE see id. at ¶¶ 196–201; systemic JCE see id. at ¶¶ 202–03; extended JCE see 
id. at ¶¶ 204–19. 
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determined that “[c]lose scrutiny of the relevant case law shows that broadly 
speaking, the notion of common purpose encompasses three distinct categories of 
collective criminality.”22 
The three forms of JCE recognized in the Tadić Appeal Judgement are: (i) 
basic (“JCE 1”) in which “all co-defendants, acting pursuant to a common 
design, possess the same criminal intention” to commit a crime23; (ii) systemic or 
concentration camp cases (“JCE 2”) in which the accused is aware of and intends 
to further a system of ill-treatment24; and (iii) extended (“JCE 3”), “where one of 
the perpetrators commits an act which, while outside the common design, was 
nevertheless a natural and foreseeable consequence of the effecting of that 
common purpose.”25 
The Tadić Appeal Judgement determined that all three types of JCE have the 
same objective element,26 which can be proved through the existence of: (i) a 
plurality of persons or identifiable group27; (ii) the existence of a “common plan, 
design or purpose which amounts to or involves the commission of a crime 
provided for in the Statute”28; and (iii) the participation29 of the accused in this 
common plan.30 
By contrast, the Appeals Chamber further deduced that the subjective 
element required to impose criminal responsibility under JCE differs for each 
type of JCE. It concluded that: 
JCE 1 requires “the intent to perpetrate a certain crime (this being the 
shared intent on the part of all co-perpetrators).”31 This means that all 
 
20. See id. at ¶¶ 221–23. 
21. Id. at ¶¶ 224–25. 
22. Id. at ¶ 195. 
23. Id. at ¶ 196; See also id. at ¶¶ 197–201. 
24. Id. at ¶¶ 202–03. 
25. Id. at ¶ 204; See also id. at ¶¶ 205–19. 
26. Id. at ¶ 227. 
27. See id. at ¶ 227. Such a group need not be militarily or hierarchically organized. 
28. Id. This common plan need not have been previously arranged and may materialize 
extemporaneously. 
29. Id.; Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Judgement, ¶ 97 (Feb. 28, 2005). This 
participation need not entail the commission of the crime and need not be substantial; the accused need only 
significantly participate in someway with the required subjective element. 
30. Each of these elements and the corresponding evidentiary standards have been further defined in 
subsequent cases before the ICTY and ICTR. See e.g., Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, 
Judgement, ¶ 421 (Feb. 28, 2005); Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgement, ¶ 410 (Apr. 3, 
2007); Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Judgement, ¶ 662 (Mar. 17, 2009); Prosecutor v. Šainović 
et al., Case No. IT-05-87-A, Judgement, ¶ 1,682 (Jan. 23, 2014); Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-
88-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 1670–1674 (Jan 30, 2015); Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana, Case Nos. 
ICTR-96-10-A ICTR-96-17-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 466–468 (Dec. 13, 2004); Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Case No. 
ICTR-97-36A-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 160–161 (Sept. 28, 2011); Nizeyimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-00-55C-
A, Judgement, ¶¶ 327–333 (Sept. 29, 2014). 
31. Tadić Appeal Judgement, supra note 3, at ¶ 228. 
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members of the JCE must share the intent to commit the crimes alleged 
in the common purpose, and that the prosecution must prove that, at the 
time of the commission of the crime, the accused had such intent. 
JCE 2 requires that the accused have “personal knowledge of the system of 
ill-treatment [ . . . ] as well as the intent to further this common concerted system 
of ill-treatment.”32 
JCE 3 requires that the accused intend “to participate in and further the 
criminal activity or the criminal purpose of a group and to contribute to the joint 
criminal enterprise or in any event to the commission of a crime by the group.”33 
Additionally, as JCE 3 is an extended form of JCE liability, it provides that the 
accused may be held responsible for crimes outside of the common criminal 
purpose if: “(i) it was foreseeable that such a crime might be perpetrated by one 
or other members of the group and (ii) the accused willingly took that risk.”34 
This foreseeability may vary for each member of the JCE; the prosecution must 
prove that the crime was foreseeable to the accused personally. Furthermore, the 
last element, that the accused willingly took the risk that the crime might be 
committed, is often referred to as the principle of dolus eventualis or advertent 
recklessness—more than mere negligence.35 
In sum, the Tadić Appeal Judgement effectively set out the requirements for, 
and applicability of, individual criminal responsibility for acts of collective 
criminality through JCE; and concluded that JCE liability is firmly established in 
customary international law and thus, can be enforced at the ICTY. 
Since the Tadić Appeal Judgement, the ICTY has analyzed JCE liability in 
most of the cases before the Tribunal.36 In fact, JCE liability is more utilized at 
the ICTY than at any other international criminal tribunal.37 Except for the 
clarification of some aspects of its elements, the jurisprudence inaugurated in the 
Tadić Appeal Judgement has been constantly maintained in its essential features. 
The most frequent issues faced by the ICTY trial chambers concerned the 
assessment of the actual existence of the elements of the JCE in concrete cases in 
light of the evidence adduced by the parties. In that context, there may have been 




34. Id. (emphasis in original). 
35. Id. at ¶ 220. 
36. See supra note 30 (giving examples of cases which have analyzed JCE liability). 
37. For example, the Prosecutors at the ICTR have less frequently pursued JCE liability. This may be 
attributable to the fact that the existence of the Rwandan genocide is an adjudicated fact at the ICTR and thus 
such crimes can be alleged through incitement and conspiracy to commit genocide. In the early years of the 
ICTR, these genocide-based offences were preferred over JCE allegations but since the Trial Judgement in the 
case against Aloys Simba, many ICTR indictments have been amended to include JCE liability. See Prosecutor 
v. Aloys Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-T, Judgement, (Dec. 13, 2005) (which is the first ICTR Trial Judgement 
to convict an accused under JCE). 
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and the appeals chamber, which do not affect the notion of JCE as initially 
described by the Tadić Appeals Chamber. 
However, the possibility that a mere consideration of facts may indirectly 
affect the law cannot be entirely excluded, and it occurred with the recent Appeal 
Judgement in the Gotovina and Markac case.38 This is a well-known judgement, 
dealing with the so called “Operation Storm” whereby Croatia again seized 
control of the Krajina region, where there was also a numerous Serbian 
population.39 According to the indictment, political leaders and members of the 
Croatian armed forces had committed crimes during the operation in the 
implementation of a common plan to achieve the deportation and the forced 
transfer of a significant part of the Serbian population.40 The Trial Chamber came 
to the conclusion that there was indeed a JCE, the common purpose of which was 
the permanent removal of the Serbian population from the region through 
unlawful attacks against civilians and other types of crimes.41 It also concluded 
that general Gotovina shared this common plan and significantly contributed to 
its achievement.42 Therefore, the Trial Chamber convicted general Gotovina for 
persecution and deportation as crimes against humanity pursuant to JCE 1. It also 
found him guilty of other crimes committed during the implementation of the 
common plan pursuant to JCE 3.43 The same occurred with the other accused. 
In order to reach its conclusion, the Trial Chamber considered four mutually 
supporting facts. First, the minutes of a meeting during which the participants, 
including the two accused, discussed the importance of removing the Serbian 
civil population from the region as a part of the imminent attacks and as 
preparation for Operation Storm.44 Second, the displacement towards Bosnia-
Herzegovia and Serbia of at least 20,000 persons as the consequence of the 
attacks with artillery against civilians ordered by the accused in four towns.45 
Third, the crimes committed by military forces against the Serbian civilian 
population without any preventive intervention of the accused.46 Fourth, the 
discriminatory policy and laws of the Croatian political leaders against the 
Serbian minority, which favored the return of Croatian refugees, including in the 
residencies of the Serbs who had left the country.47 
 
38. Prosecutor v. Gotovina and Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Judgement, (Nov. 16, 2012) [hereinafter 
Gotovina and Markač Appeal Judgement]. 





44. See e.g., Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina et al., Case No. IT-06-90-T, Judgement, (Apr. 15, 2011), 
¶¶ 1970–95, 2304–05, 2310–11 [hereinafter Judgement]. 
45. See e.g., id. at ¶¶ 1163–1476, 1540–44, 1549–51, 1558–87, 1590–92, 1607–42, 1742–53, 1892–1945, 
2305–06, 2311. 
46. See e.g., id. at ¶¶ 1756–58, 2307. 
47. See e.g., id. at ¶¶ 1843–46, 1997–2057, 2059–98, 2308–09, 2312. 
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The Appeals Chamber took a different approach. It revised the conclusions 
of the Gotovina et al. Trial Judgement and declared that there was insufficient 
evidence to sustain the existence of a JCE. In particular, it stressed that the 
military attacks on the four towns could not be characterized as indiscriminate 
attacks and did not violate the principle of distinction under international 
humanitarian law. As a consequence of these assessments, it reversed the Trial 
Chamber’s finding that a JCE existed to permanently remove the Serb civilian 
population from the Krajina region by force or threat of force. As a further 
consequence, it reversed all of the accuseds’ convictions for the crimes allegedly 
committed pursuant to the JCE. Thus, the two accused were acquitted of all 
charges.48 This Appeals Chamber judgement was adopted by a majority, with two 
firm dissenting opinions, including the dissenting opinion of the author of these 
notes. 
Without going into the substance of the debate, it is important to discuss how 
this Appeal Judgement may have affected the doctrine of individual criminal 
responsibility through a JCE. Two comments are relevant here. 
First, the consideration that the military attacks did not violate international 
humanitarian law and were therefore lawful does not necessarily entail that a JCE 
could not exist. The objective element of the JCE consists of the participation of a 
person in a group that shares a common purpose, that is characterized as 
unlawful—in this case, the permanent removal of a significant part of the Serbian 
population from the region, as it actually happened through persecutions, 
deportation, forcible transfer, unlawful attacks against civilians, and 
discriminatory measures.49 It does not matter if any of the measures taken to 
achieve this goal are lawful, if taken in isolation. Their prohibition under JCE 
liability depends on their adoption in order to implement a plan, characterized by 
the unlawfulness of its purpose.50 Affirming with the majority of the Appeals 
Chamber that all the means deployed for the achievement of the common illegal 
goal have to be of themselves unlawful improperly adds to the notion of JCE an 
objective element, which was never recognized in the precedent case law of the 
ICTY. Was it the intention of the majority of the Appeals Chamber to modify the 
previous jurisprudence of the ICTY? There is no evidence of such an intention, 
or of an awareness of this legal consequence, apparent in the Gotovina and 
Markač Appeal Judgement, but this is what actually happened. 
Second, one should be aware that a modification of the notion of JCE in this 
direction—i.e. requiring the unlawfulness of the means deployed for the 
achievement of a common unlawful design as an essential element of the 
existence of a JCE—will entail that in most cases the higher ranking persons 
 
48. See Gotovina and Markač Appeal Judgement, supra note 38, at ¶¶ 98, 157. 
49. Id. at ¶ 23. 
50. In this respect, the author emphasizes that under JCE liability, a common plan can be characterized as 
criminal when the goal of the common plan is in and of itself criminal and/or when the common plan, although 
not necessarily criminal in itself, is intended to be achieved through the commission of international crimes. 
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accused of international crimes may not be regarded as members of a JCE even 
when they intend a common criminal goal. However, the doctrine of JCE liability 
is rooted in and was elaborated precisely in order to allow the prosecution of all 
the members of a plurality of persons or group pursuing a common criminal 
purpose, including, in particular, persons of high rank, whether political or 
military, who may not have been the principle perpetrators of international 
crimes. As was the case in the penultimate Appeal Judgement of the ICTY, 
wherein the Appeals Chamber affirmed that “one’s contribution to a joint 
criminal enterprise need not be in and of itself criminal, as long as the accused 
performs acts (or fails to perform acts) that in some way contribute significantly 
to the furtherance of the common [criminal] purpose.”51 Whereas to the contrary, 
a jurisprudence endorsing a modification in line with the Gotovina and Markač 
Appeal Judgement would have serious consequences as it would favor the 
impunity of those who are most responsible for international crimes, while the 
role of international criminal justice is precisely to prosecute such persons and 
convict them, if they are proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. With this risk in 
mind and recognizing that our current global environment is still, unfortunately 
tattered by mass atrocities, one must instead challenge this functional impunity 
and continue to apply customary international law, including the principle of 
JCE, which ensures that those proven to be most responsible for such atrocities 
are held accountable. 
 
 
51. Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Župljanin, Case No. IT-08-91-A, Judgement, ¶ 110 (Jun. 30, 2016). 
